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THE MEDIUM MATTERS: THE EFFECTS OF MEDIA 
ATTRIBUTES AND EVIDENCE STRENGTH ON BELIEF 
REVISION 
Nöteberg, Anna H., University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1074 CX Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands, noteberg@uva.nl 
Abstract 
Face-to-face meetings between auditors and their clients are increasingly difficult to arrange, due to 
business globalization and the growing need for rapid audit decision-making.  Relying on electronic 
communication media, such as e-mail or video conferencing for auditor-client inquiry may be a 
logical and simple solution to this problem.  However, it may also introduce some threats to the 
communication process.  This paper posits that the use of electronic communication media biases the 
ways in which auditors update their beliefs as a result of information inquiry. We examine to what 
extent media attributes affect the auditor’s belief revision, given persuasive intentions on the client’s 
side.  The media attributes of interest in this paper are (1) a medium’s cue multiplicity (the extent to 
which the medium can communicate peripheral cues) and (2) reprocessability (a medium’s ability to 
archive messages).  Drawing on the Belief Adjustment Model and the Elaboration Likelihood Model, 
we demonstrate that the effect of cue multiplicity depends on the strength of the arguments provided by 
the client and whether messages can be reprocessed.  We report the results of a laboratory experiment 
conducted with 199 practicing graduate accounting students.  
Keywords: Cue multiplicity, Reprocessability, Evidence Strength, Belief revision, Auditor-client 
inquiry, Sequential and simultaneous processing. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
New electronic media, such as e-mail and video-conferencing systems, are increasingly used for 
communication in and between organizations (Baltes, Dickson, Sherman, Bauer, and LaGanke, 2002; 
Strauss and McGrath, 1994).  This development gives people in geographically dispersed 
organizations the opportunity to share information and make decisions effectively and efficiently 
without having to meet face-to-face.  In the same way, we witness an increasing dispersion of audit 
firms and their client companies across the globe, which necessitates the use of virtual meetings for 
client inquiry.  During an audit engagement, client inquiry is used as one of several methods to collect 
relevant evidence by gathering explanatory information from client representatives.  Based on client-
provided evidence, the auditor commonly forms his or her judgments.  There is reason to believe that 
the use of electronic media for client inquiry affects auditors’ information processing strategies, 
particularly when the client has persuasive intentions.  Audit judgments may be ultimately biased or 
distorted.  This issue is of particular importance in the auditing profession, where most stakeholders 
rely on the objectivity and truthfulness of auditors’ statements.   
In this paper, we assume the following scenario, not uncommon in auditor-client negotiations.  The 
auditor has tentatively recommended that the client make a material adjustment in the financial 
statements.  The auditor believes that the remaining inventory of a certain kind is obsolete and should 
be written-down by a certain amount.  The client however disagrees and claims substantive reasons for 
a lesser write-down.  Given an initially strong belief on the auditor’s side, the client (represented by 
the chief financial officer (CFO) of the client company) sends persuasive messages to the auditor, 
suggesting a lesser adjustment by providing a set of justifications.  We now theorize that the type of 
media used for communication will have an impact on the way and the extent to which the evidence-
seeking auditor revises his/her belief.   
The research model developed here examines why and how the use of electronic communication 
media during client inquiry affects the auditor’s belief revision, particularly in cases where the client 
has persuasive intentions.  To address this question, we examine the influence of the evidence strength 
of the communicated message (weak vs. strong arguments), the medium’s ability to reprocess 
(archive) messages, and the medium’s cue multiplicity (i.e., the extent to which the medium makes 
available various non-content related (peripheral) cues, such as body language, facial expressions, 
voice intonations), on auditors’ belief revision strength.  Note that in terms of cue multiplicity, we 
consider only peripheral cues (i.e., auditory and visual cues) that support the underlying message 
given by central cues.  Our research model predicts a three-way interaction among the three variables 
of interest. 
2 THEORY  
Reprocessability and cue multiplicity are the two media attributes of interest in this study.  
Reprocessability refers to a feature that allows users to re-examine messages while engaged in dialog 
(Dennis and Valacich, 1999).  Multiplicity of cues represents the number of ways in which a medium 
can communicate information other than the content of the message, such as auditory cues (e.g., voice 
tone and inflection) and visual cues (e.g., facial gestures and body language) (Chen and Chaiken, 
1999; Daft, Lengel, and Klebe Trevino, 1987).  We predict that the effect of cue multiplicity on the 
auditor’s belief revision strength ultimately depends on the strength of the evidence conveyed during 
auditor-client inquiry and whether the recipient can reprocess evidence or not.   
 
2.1 Evidence strength 
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981), message 
recipients may follow two distinct routes when processing persuasive information, the central or the 
peripheral route.  When the central route of persuasion is chosen, message recipients systematically 
scrutinize the validity of arguments contained in a persuasive message, and revise their initial beliefs 
as a result of the content-related aspects of the message.  When a peripheral information-processing 
strategy is employed, decision-makers rely on secondary, non-content related cues (as reviewed in 
section 2.3).  In accordance with the ELM, we describe evidence strength as a central cue.  It captures 
the pure signal of a message.  Given that message recipients are motivated and able to process the 
central cue of a message, they will revise their belief more strongly when the central cue is strong as 
compared to weak.  We posit that evidence strength has a positive influence on belief revision, i.e., the 
stronger the evidence provided by the client, the more persuasive it is and the more will the auditor 
adjust his or her belief.  
H1: There is a positive relationship between evidence strength and belief revision strength.  
2.2 Reprocessability  
Reprocessability refers to a feature that allows users to re-examine messages while engaged in dialog 
(Dennis and Valacich, 1999).  It is a media attribute that acts as an “externally recorded memory” 
(Sproull, 1991) and thereby aids in understanding the situation, particularly as the volume, complexity, 
or equivocality of the message increase.  While reprocessability has been examined only with regard 
to its effect on performance (Dennis and Valacich, 1999), we are interested in its effect on belief 
revision.  We review the two processing strategies implicit in the Belief Adjustment Model (BAM), 
sequential processing and simultaneous processing, to explain reprocessability effects on belief 
revision. 
The Belief Adjustment Model (BAM) (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992) posits that the information 
processing strategy employed by decision-makers affects belief adjustment.  Individuals use different 
information processing strategies when faced with evidential matter consisting of multiple pieces.  
Sequential processing takes place when individuals adjust their beliefs incrementally as each piece of 
evidence is offered.  Simultaneous processing means that the initial anchor is adjusted upon 
presentation of the full, aggregate set of evidential matter.   
The area of interest in this study is the auditor’s strength of belief revision as a result of processing 
disconfirming evidence.  There is reason to believe that individuals make stronger belief revisions 
when information is elicited in a sequential format, as compared to a simultaneous format.  Ashton and 
Ashton (1988) note that when auditors have a disconfirmation-prone attitude, sequential evaluation of 
consistently negative evidence will result in more extreme belief change than simultaneous processing 
of the same evidence, a phenomenon called the “dilution effect” (Ashton and Ashton, 1988).  
Consequently, belief revision should be stronger when evidence is processed sequentially as opposed 
to simultaneously.  For instance, if individuals are presented with 10 pieces of negative evidence in a 
simultaneous format and are asked for their beliefs, they will typically adjust their beliefs negatively.  
Furthermore, if individuals are asked to revise beliefs after each of the 10 pieces of evidence is 
presented, their final belief state will be more negative than in the simultaneous format.   
The reason for this effect is that sequential evidence processing offers more opportunities to anchor 
and adjust than simultaneous processing.  More frequent information displays increase the value 
relevance of the information and cause individuals to increase the amount of anchoring and adjustment 
of their beliefs, resulting in a more extreme revision in the direction of the evidence (Francis and 
Schipper, 1999).  Research has indeed found that individuals over-adjust in the direction of the 
informational items (e.g., Pinsker, 2003). 
Returning to the media attribute of interest, let us first contemplate the use of a medium that lacks 
reprocessability, i.e., messages are not stored for later re-examination.  Hence, during belief revision, 
the information recipient can only process persuasive evidence once and does not have the means to 
go back and again process the arguments.  As a result, the decision-maker is compelled to process the 
evidence simultaneously to produce a revised judgment.  Next, assume that the medium used for 
message conveyance allows the decision-maker to re-examine the given evidence cues after a first 
round of processing, i.e., a medium possessing the attribute of reprocessability.  We argue that the 
ability to reprocess messages evokes a sequential processing strategy, because the decision-maker has 
multiple occasions to revise his or her initial belief by re-examining the evidence.  While previous 
research has only considered the sequential or simultaneous processing of central message cues, we 
include the processing of peripheral cues as well.  As will be described in the following section, some 
media convey a higher level of cue multiplicity than others.  We predict stronger belief revision when 
central and peripheral cues are processed sequentially as compared to simultaneously.  Hence, we 
expect that belief revision strength will increase with the presence of reprocessability as compared to 
its absence.  The following hypothesis is offered: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between reprocessability and belief revision strength. 
So far, we have predicted positive effects of both reprocessability and evidence strength on belief 
revision.  Further, while we assume that cue multiplicity will also affect belief revision positively, we 
posit that its positive effect will vary in strength, depending on the strength of the evidence and the 
absence or presence of reprocessability. 
2.3 Cue multiplicity 
While evidence strength (as described earlier) captures the pure signal of a message as reflected by the 
central route to persuasion, we add peripheral message cues to our model, in order to further elucidate 
a decision-maker’s reaction to persuasive evidence.  When a peripheral information processing-
strategy is employed, recipients rely on secondary, personal and social cues in their belief revision, 
which are not related to the message itself (Chen and Chaiken, 1999).  Cues such as source 
attractiveness and a pleasurable voice may have persuasive power without raising considerable mental 
effort for evaluation of the central message.  
Communication media may hold a high or low level of cue multiplicity.  Media that restrict the 
availability of peripheral factors provide a low level of cue multiplicity (e.g., e-mail), whereas those 
that provide access to such cues contain a high level of cue multiplicity (e.g., video-recorded 
presentations).  Previous research has examined the impact of cue multiplicity on various 
communication outcomes, such as managers’ decision performance in terms of effectiveness and 
efficiency (e.g., Daft and Lengel, 1986; Daft, Lengel, and Klebe Trevino, 1987; Dennis and Kinney, 
1998; Hollingshead, McGrath, and O'Connor, 1993; Kraut, Galegher, Fish, and Chalfonte, 1992; Rice, 
1992; Suh, 1999), attitude change (e.g., Matheson and Zanna, 1989), communicator likeability (e.g., 
Weisband and Atwater, 1999).  We are here interested in the effect of cue multiplicity on belief 
revision. 
As suggested by Chaiken and Eagly (1983), we posit that high cue multiplicity enables peripheral 
processing by drawing the message recipient’s attention to the communicator’s peripheral cues.  Thus, 
assuming that peripheral signals comprise the same direction as the central cue, a medium with high 
cue multiplicity should generally enhance the message’s persuasiveness, as compared to a medium 
low in cue multiplicity.  We posit that the belief revision effect of cue multiplicity depends on the 
strength of the evidence and the presence or absence of reprocessability, as reviewed next. 
First, let us consider evidence that is weak in nature.  In other words, the information sender provides 
persuasive evidence, which disconfirms the recipient’s initial belief, employing relatively weak 
arguments.  Hypothesis 3 concerns belief revision effects of cue multiplicity when evidence is weak 
and reprocessability is either present or absent. 
Assuming weak evidence and the absence of reprocessability, cue multiplicity has a positive effect on 
belief revision.  As described earlier, when individuals are exposed to peripheral cues that support the 
central message, their belief revision will increase as opposed to the lack of peripheral cues.   
Further, the presence of reprocessability will significantly amplify the positive effect of cue 
multiplicity, because individuals are not only exposed to additional, supportive peripheral information, 
but they are also exposed to this information more than once, due to reprocessability.  Reprocessability 
gives decision-makers multiple opportunities to anchor and adjust central and peripheral cues.  
Individuals may be particularly susceptible to anchoring and adjusting peripheral cues when central 
cues are weak.  As a result, given weak evidence, the effect of cue multiplicity on belief revision 
strength is more powerful when the medium provides reprocessability.  Thus, we posit Hypothesis 3: 
H3:  When evidence is weak, the difference in belief revision strength between high and 
low cue multiplicity is greater when reprocessability is present as compared to absent. 
We have so far considered the effects of cue multiplicity on belief revision strength, when the 
conveyed information is weak in nature and reprocessability is either present or absent.  Hypothesis 3 
suggests an additive effect of the two media attributes.  This interaction pattern is expected to change 
considerably in the light of strong evidence.   
Assuming strong evidence and the absence of reprocessability, higher as compared to lower cue 
multiplicity is still expected to strengthen belief adjustment considerably.  Posit that the auditor is 
exposed to strong pieces of evidence by e-mail.  While belief revision will be relatively strong already 
(due to strong arguments), it will become even stronger when the medium provides a high level of cue 
multiplicity (e.g., video), for reasons discussed earlier.  
However, this cue multiplicity effect becomes less pronounced when strong evidence can be 
reprocessed.  The reason is that peripheral cues are expected to exert a negligible effect on belief 
adjustment in the light of strong evidence and the presence of reprocessability.   For instance, assume 
that an auditor is exposed to a list of very strong arguments.  Given the chance to reprocess the 
arguments, his or her ultimate belief adjustment level will most likely be reached without further 
persuasion introduced by peripheral cues.  This prediction considers the occurrence of a ceiling effect 
when evidence is strong and reprocessability is present.  We argue that the effect of evidence strength 
and reprocessability alone will cause decision-makers to reach the maximum belief revision possible.  
Adding peripheral cues to the message will not make much difference, because decision-makers have 
already reached their ‘ceiling’.  Accordingly, Hypothesis 4 is offered. 
H4:  When evidence is strong, the difference in belief revision strength between high and 
low multiplicity of cues is lesser when reprocessability is present as compared to 
absent. 
3 METHOD 
A laboratory experiment was conducted to investigate and test research hypotheses.  The experiment 
reflected a 2 by 2 by 2 between-subjects, full-factorial, pre- and post-test design.   
3.1 Sample 
Participants were practicing accountants enrolled in part-time graduate accounting/auditing training 
programs at two universities.  This sample understands the experimental task, given their training and 
professional experience.  14 computerized sessions were run and each session lasted approximately 45 
minutes (including instructions and debriefing).  The amount of participants varied between 5 and 28 
across sessions.  An incentive to perform well was provided to participants by giving them the 
opportunity to win one out of two digital video cameras.   
3.2 Experimental task and procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight treatment conditions. Participants in this 
experiment were asked to make a judgment based on certain background information and the 
manipulated additional evidence cues.   
All participants were instructed to assume the role of a partner in a large accounting firm, in charge of 
the audit of a computer manufacturer called “MicroClone”.  According to the background case, the 
auditor’s current task is to evaluate whether client-provided explanations account for problems that 
have been detected in the company’s finished goods inventory valued at €2 million.  Specifically, a 
review of the situation reveals to the audit team that the company may have overvalued their inventory 
of 4th generation personal computers by about €400,000.  5th generation computers are becoming 
current standard.  Therefore, it seems that the 4th generation computers should be written off as 
obsolete, since they will be difficult to sell at the estimated price. 
This background case was pre-tested to invoke a strong belief anchor regarding the suggested 
inventory write-down of €400,000.  Experiment participants were asked to state their current belief 
regarding this figure, used as the anchor or pre-test measurement during analysis. 
Next, the company’s CFO reacts on the concerns by sending five explanations for why the 4th 
generation computers should be written down at an amount less than €400,000.  The five arguments 
provided by MicroClone’s CFO were presented in random order and according to one out of the eight 
treatment conditions.  All CFO-provided arguments, whether strong or weak, were designed to be 
consistently in disagreement with the background information, thus expected to cause participants to 
make a downward belief revision regarding the inventory write-down estimation.   
Having read the manipulated information, participants were again asked to state their updated belief 
regarding the €400,000 figure, followed by a post-experimental questionnaire, collecting data on 
manipulation checks and demographics.  Finally, all participants were exposed to a filler task, which 
prevented them from leaving while others in the room were still working on the main task.  Once 
experimental data from all participants was received, participants were debriefed.  
3.3 Treatments 
We manipulated each factor at two levels, i.e., evidence strength high or low, reprocessability absent 
or present, and cue multiplicity high or low, resulting in eight (8) treatment conditions. 
We view evidence strength as a function of source objectivity, source independence and evidence 
verifiability.  In each one of the five messages, the CFO refers to a secondary evidence source, which 
confirms the argument that the CFO provides.  Messages that were manipulated to be weak in nature 
refer to a source inside the company.  Using an internal source was expected to create doubts among 
participants with regard to the source’s independence.  Further, this person’s role description is 
designed to poorly qualify him/her to make the statement provided.  This mismatch of qualification 
was designed to make participants suspicious about source credibility. 
Participants in the strong evidence treatment condition were exposed to the same argument in terms of 
content.  However, in this case, the CFO refers to a well-known expert who confirms the CFO’s 
message in a published article, attached to the message.  This source is external to the audited 
company and therefore independent.  The source is also described as an expert in the field, which was 
expected to increase its perceived credibility.  Further, in the strong evidence scenario, participants 
were informed that the senior manager of the audit verified the genuineness of the published article, 
thus increasing evidence verifiability. 
With regard to reprocessability, this study considers two treatment conditions, i.e., CFO-provided 
messages are either re-examined or not.  Following the first round of message exposure, participants in 
the ‘reprocessability present’ condition were instructed to review messages a second time.  
Participants in the ‘reprocessability absent’ condition were not given the opportunity to review 
messages after the first round but were instead linked straight to the screens displaying post-
manipulation questions.   
Cue multiplicity was manipulated by presenting evidence by either e-mail or video.  First, electronic 
mail, a well-known and widely used communication medium, is low in cue multiplicity.  Its 
predominant form of communication is written text, which does not allow for any peripheral cues.  
The presentation format chosen for high cue multiplicity was a set of five separate video files that 
were displayed on the participants’ screens.  Upon activation, each video clip showed the CFO 
conveying the message using the same wording as the e-mails.  Instead of utilizing the power of 
acting, we employed other peripheral cues in the video format to maintain a high level of peripheral 
persuasiveness.  As a result, the chosen actor was male, around fifty years of age, dressed in a dark 
suit and wearing glasses, i.e., a stereotypical business professional as portrayed in the mass media.  
The video clips show his head and upper torso (a so-called “medium shot”) in an office environment, 
i.e., seated at a desk in daylight with a computer next to him.   
3.4 Measures 
The dependent variable to test our hypotheses was belief strength regarding the audited company’s 
inventory valuation, following CFO-provided evidence.  The belief strength was measured based on 
the assessment made after the five CFO-provided explanations were presented to participants (the 
post-test measure).  The 7-point Likert dependent variable measure read:  “Given the available 
information, I strongly believe that MicroClone should write down their 4th generation inventory by 
the entire amount of €400,000.” 
We measured participants’ belief anchor employing the same measurement as for the dependent 
measure.  Before they were exposed to the five pieces of additional information (the treatment), 
participants were thus asked to state their current belief strength in an inventory write-down estimation 
of €400,000.  This initial measure constituted the belief anchor or pre-test and was used as a covariate 
during data analysis. 
4 DATA ANALYSIS 
4.1 Sample demographics 
A total of 199 practicing, graduate, part-time accounting students participated in this study, out of 
which 189 observations were finally used for analysis.  10 observations were removed from the data 
because these participants revised their beliefs upward, thus apparently not understanding the task.  
Individual cell sizes for all eight conditions ranged from 21 to 26, with a median cell size of 23 and a 
mode of 26.   
In summary, participants were between 20 and 52 years of age (M = 26.67, SD = 5.210).  123 
participants (65.1%) were male, while 66 (34.9%) were female.  This slight over-representation of 
males in the sample reflects the gender distribution in the auditing profession.  131 (69.3%) 
participants were in their first year of graduate education, 38 (20.1%) were in their second, and 20 
(10.6%) participants were in their third year. Most participants had some level of work experience in 
the field of accounting and/or controlling.  13 participants (6.9%) had no experience at all, 21 (11.1%) 
had less than a year of work experience, 44 (23.3%) had been working between 1 and 2 years, 96 
(50.8%) had between 3 and 5 years of experience, 13 (6.9%) had worked up to 10 years and one (.5%) 
participant had more than 10 years of accounting/controlling experience.  Participants were enrolled at 
one out of two Dutch universities at which data was also collected. 
Treatment conditions did not vary significantly when compared across the demographic variables – 
location, session, age, gender, year of study, educational background and work experience – indicating 
successful treatment randomization. 
4.2 Preliminary testing 
All manipulation checks were significant and in the intended direction, indicating that participants 
were aware of which treatment condition they were in.  
This design employed a pre-post-test measurement design, for which the analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) is a commonly employed method.  The belief anchor measure was incorporated as a 
covariate in the final model to adjust for pre-test differences.  We used ANCOVA to test for main and 
interactive effects of message reprocessability (present or absent), evidence strength (high or low) and 
cue multiplicity (high or low) on belief revision strength.   
Full factorial ANCOVA results using pre-test and location as covariates (see Table 1) indicated a 
significant three-way interaction (reprocessability by evidence strength by cue multiplicity), a 
significant two-way interaction (cue multiplicity by reprocessability) and a significant main effect 
(evidence strength).  The covariate ‘belief anchor’ had a significant effect on belief revision strength. 
 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 150.075a 8 18.759 10.330 .000
Intercept 9.336 1 9.336 5.141 .025
Pretest Belief 114.079 1 114.079 62.819 .000
Evidence Strength 5.201 1 5.201 2.864 .092
Reprocessability 0.08029 1 0.08029 .044 .834
Cue Multiplicity .359 1 .359 .198 .657
Evidence Strength * Reprocessability 2.712 1 2.712 1.493 .223
Evidence Strength * Cue Multiplicity 1.073 1 1.073 .591 .443
Reprocessability * Cue Multiplicity 12.784 1 12.784 7.040 .009
Evidence Strength * Reprocessability * Cue Multiplicity 9.296 1 9.296 5.119 .025
Error 326.877 180 1.816 
Total 1696.000 189  
Corrected Total 476.952 188  
R Squared = .315 (Adjusted R Squared = .284) 
Table 1. ANCOVA 
4.3 Hypotheses testing  
Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive effect of evidence strength on belief revision strength.  Empirical 
results support this hypothesis (see Table 1).  However, since the ANCOVA shows an interaction 
between the three factors, we need to be cautious when analyzing and interpreting such main effects.  
While we here preliminarily support H1, we refer the reader to the analysis of the observed three-way 
interaction for a more detailed interpretation. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive effect of reprocessability on belief revision strength.  This 
hypothesis was not supported by our observations (see Table 1).  However, as indicated by the 
significant three-way interaction, reprocessability is significantly related to belief revision strength, as 
will be analyzed next. 
In order to test Hypotheses 3 and 4, we conducted four planned pair-wise mean comparisons.  To test 
Hypothesis 3, we first examined the difference in belief revision means between treatment group 5 and 
7 (see Table 2).  Examining the pairwise comparisons for these four groups, we found that both mean 
comparisons are significant (see Table 2).  This finding enables further analysis in terms of the 
differing magnitudes.  Comparing mean difference magnitudes, we discovered that they invert.   
 
Adjusted Posttest Mean of 
Treatment Condition vs.
Adjusted Posttest Mean of 
Treatment Condition Mean Difference Significance
1 
High Cue Multiplicity 
High Reprocessability 
High Evidence Strength 
2.598 vs. 3





High Cue Multiplicity 
Low Reprocessability 
High Evidence Strength 
2.392 vs. 4





High Cue Multiplicity 
High Reprocessability 
Low Evidence Strength 
2.094 vs. 7





High Cue Multiplicity 
Low Reprocessability 
Low Evidence Strength 
3.260 vs. 8




* p < .01 
** p < .05 
Table 2. Planned comparisons for hypothesis testing (H3 and H4) 
A graphical representation of this finding illustrates this relationship (see Figure 1).  Table 2 shows 
that cue multiplicity had the predicted positive effect on belief revision strength when reprocessability 
was present (p = .006).  Belief revision was (as hypothesized) stronger when evidence was presented 
by video as compared to e-mail.  However, when reprocessability was absent, cue multiplicity had a 
negative effect on belief revision strength (p = .022).  Here, belief revision was stronger when 
evidence was presented by a medium possessing a low level of cue multiplicity (e-mail) as compared 
to a medium with a high cue multiplicity level (video). The difference in belief revision strength 
between relatively high and low multiplicity of cues is indeed greater when reprocessability is present 




































Figure 1. The relationship between cue multiplicity and belief revision strength when evidence 
is weak1 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the mean difference in belief revision between groups 2 and 4 would be 
greater than the difference between groups 1 and 3 (see Table 2).  However, planned mean 
                                              
1 For illustrative reasons, the mean scores used in Figure 1 are based on the percentage belief revision, i.e., using a score computed by 
dividing participants’ post-test by their pre-test and subtracting the result from 1. 
comparisons produce non-significant results for both mean comparisons (see Table 2).  This finding 
indicates that, given strong evidence, belief revision remains equal across cue multiplicity levels, 
regardless of reprocessability.  Thus, in light of strong evidence, we cannot conclude any difference in 
belief revision strength between high and low cue multiplicity when reprocessability is present as 
compared to absent.  As a result, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
Let us now return to the effect of reprocessability on belief revision strength (H2).  We noted that no 
main effect was found.  However, during post-hoc analyses, we compared the effect of 
reprocessability, holding evidence strength and cue multiplicity either high or low.  Given strong 
evidence, we found no effect of reprocessability, neither for high nor low cue multiplicity.  Further, 
given weak evidence, multiple post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that the effect of 
reprocessability is insignificant for low cue multiplicity but significant and positive for high cue 
multiplicity (p < .10).  In graphical terms (see Figure 1), this means that the line representing low cue 
multiplicity is statistically parallel, whereas the line representing high cue multiplicity is ascending.  
Hence, reprocessability did indeed affect belief revision strength when evidence was weak and cue 
multiplicity was high, partially confirming H2.  These findings will be discussed in the next section.  
5 RESULTS 
Our theory suggests that the interaction effect of cue multiplicity and reprocessability is related to an 
additive effect when evidence is weak.  Further, to account for the different interaction effect for 
strong evidence, we suggested a ceiling effect.  However, empirical findings cast a different light on 
the found interaction.  
First, when strong evidence was presented to experiment participants, belief revision strength was 
entirely unaffected by cue multiplicity, reprocessability, and their interaction.  Belief revision strength 
remained equal, regardless of the medium used for information conveyance.  The most likely 
explanation for this finding is that the arguments’ objective strength took precedence over any possible 
media effects.  Arguably, participants perceived the evidence provided as sufficiently strong in its own 
right to cause a ceiling effect in their belief revision strength.  A possible conclusion to draw from this 
finding is that in light of strong evidence, individuals are strongly persuaded regardless of the media 
that the information is presented with.   
Second, when evidence was weak, the role of media attributes in auditors’ belief revision strength 
grew in importance (see Figure 1).  According to the observations, the effect of cue multiplicity 
inverted depending on whether participants reprocessed evidence cues or not.  Thus, when the medium 
lacked the reprocessability feature, the effect of cue multiplicity on belief revision strength was 
negative, whereas this effect was positive when messages could be reprocessed. 
We offer the following explanations for these findings.  When individuals are exposed to weak 
evidence lacking peripheral cues, they focus their full attention on the central cues of the message.  
While we expected that reprocessability would strengthen belief revision, this media attribute had no 
effect here.  We offer the following possible explanation for the null-effect of reprocessability in this 
scenario.  Given that central message cues were relatively non-complex and that no peripheral cues 
were available, we argue that participants possibly reached their final belief revision after the first 
round of processing.  Although participants in the “reprocessability present” condition were forced to 
go through the messages once more, their belief revision was not additionally affected by this evoked 
sequential processing, because they could only reprocess what they had already read.  Had the content 
of the messages been more complex, repeated exposure might have created the predicted belief 
revision effect.  As a result, belief revision strength did not differ across reprocessability treatment 
groups, when cue multiplicity was low. 
Next, when individuals were exposed to weak evidence conveyed by a medium with a high level of 
cue multiplicity, reprocessing messages directed recipients’ attention toward the persuasive peripheral 
cues of the message, as suggested by our theory.  When reprocessing, they probably did not listen to 
the central cues of the message again, but were instead susceptible to the peripheral cues’ 
persuasiveness, which in turn increased belief revision. 
The explanations above implicitly account for the positive effect of cue multiplicity when 
reprocessability was present and evidence was weak:  Reprocessing a weak message with peripheral 
cues directed message recipients’ attention away from the weak nature of the message, whereas 
reconsideration of a weak message without peripheral cues achieved the opposite.  Therefore, we posit 
that high cue multiplicity lead to stronger belief revision than did low cue multiplicity. 
Finally, we offer the following possible explanation for the unexpected negative effect of cue 
multiplicity when reprocessability was absent.  We posit that in the absence of reprocessability, 
individuals’ cognitive capacity was possibly overtaxed when they processed high cue multiplicity 
(video) messages.  Participants had no control over the speed of video message presentation, other 
than pushing the play/stop button.  Thus, videos were played once at a pre-determined speed.  This 
increased complexity due to (1) peripheral cues, (2) participants’ inability to control the speed of 
information reception and (3) the absence of reprocessability may have created some uncertainty 
among participants.  As a result, participants (assuming their role as auditors) may have preferred to be 
conservative in their belief revision and thus revise their beliefs only to a very limited extent.  On the 
other hand, e-mail recipients were able to read and process messages at their own pace during this one 
round of evidence presentation.  They chose to revise their beliefs more strongly than the video 
recipients, possibly because (1) the technology did not force them to process the information at a 
certain speed combined with the fact that (2) they had no peripheral cues to process.  As a result, they 
were less uncertain about the conveyed information and thus less conservative in their belief revision.  
Of course, this explanation is merely speculative.  The unexpected negative cue multiplicity effect 
calls for further research to be thoroughly explained.   
6 IMPLICATIONS 
This study provides a theoretical and empirical contribution to both information systems and auditing 
literature, as it incorporates information systems research combined with auditing related theory in a 
judgment and decision-making context.  Whereas previous media studies in IS have primarily 
examined the impact of communication media attributes on performance, this study is unique in that it 
investigates belief revision effects.  We attempted to broaden the scope of the BAM by incorporating 
the consideration of computer-mediated evidence acquiescence and the contemplation of peripheral 
cues.  While the empirical results do not fully support our hypotheses, evidence suggests that 
individuals are biased in their belief revision process, depending on the level of cue multiplicity and 
reprocessability provided by the medium.  Particularly the perception of weak evidence may be 
seriously affected depending on the presentation format.   
In a more practical regard, we demonstrate that the auditing profession, one that has to judge and rely 
on potentially biased evidence, might need to take into account the various possibilities and threats 
that computer-mediated communication for client inquiry introduce.  While technological 
developments and the use of electronic media for evidence collection provide many benefits, they may 
also bias judgment in less desirable ways, if the evidence source has deceitful intentions.  Naturally, 
such warnings apply also to other business professions that employ electronic media for 
communication and that depend on potentially biased sources for their decision-making. 
7 FUTURE RESEARCH 
While the present research is limited to a specific communication setting (auditor-client inquiry), other 
communication scenarios and the effects of media attributes on belief revision may be interesting to 
consider in future research.   
Further, this study introduced peripheral cues as an important determinant of belief revision.  
However, we only considered peripheral cues that were in accordance with the direction of the central 
message cues.  In future research, it would be interesting to investigate the interactive effect of cue 
format (central vs. peripheral), cue strength (strong or weak) and cue direction (confirming or 
disconfirming an initial belief) on belief revision strength.   
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